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Young Somalis’ social identity in Sweden and Britain. The interplay of group dynamics, 
socio-political environments, and transnational ties in social identification processes  
 
Abstract 
In this article, we aim to contribute to the literature on social identification among migrants 
and minorities by offering a theoretical framework that accounts for the interplay of socio-
psychological factors, local and transnational group dynamics, and the socio-political 
environment in which migrants live. This approach enables us to analyse not only the 
political significance of identity, but also the psychology of identity formation. Drawing upon 
qualitative data, we analyse how young Somalis (N: 43) living in the municipalities of 
Malmö (Sweden) and Ealing (United Kingdom) construct and negotiate their ethnic social 
identities in relation to: Somali elders living in the same city; Somalis in Somalia and in the 
diaspora; and the British/Swedish majority society. We show that, to secure a positive self-
identity vis-à-vis these referent groups, young Somalis engage in psychological strategies of 
separation; social competition; and social creativity. The socio-political environment in 
which they are embedded influences which strategy they adopt.  
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1. Introduction 
Decades of migration have changed the landscape of Western European cities, many of which 
are now more ethnically and religiously heterogeneous than ever and described as 'super-
diverse' (Vertovec 2007; Alba and Foner 2015). Young people of migrant heritage constitute 
a growing proportion of urban youth today. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), more 
than a quarter (27%) of the population under 30 years old identified as non-British in 2011 
(ONS 2012). In Sweden, almost a quarter (24%) of the population between 0 and 34 years old 
is of foreign background (SCB 2015). As this cohort is reaching the ages of labour-force 
entry, family formation and civic participation, some people see them as outsiders to the 
society in which they live (Waters and Kasinitz, 2012). At best, they are seen as ‘in between’ 
their parents’ and the majority society’s cultures. In the most negative depictions, their 
alleged marginality is interpreted as an indicator of their unwillingness to integrate in the 
majority society.  
At the core of these issues are questions about social identity and belonging and the multiple 
ways in which these are constructed and negotiated by young individuals of migrant descent. 
This article uses semi-structured interviews and focus groups with young Somalis living in 
Ealing, London (UK) and Malmö (Sweden) and analyses the representations of their social 
identity as ‘Somalis’1 in a comparative framework. We draw upon social psychology and 
political sociology and try to contextualise which psychological strategies young Somalis 
engage with when they represent their Somali social identity.  
In line with a Social Identity approach (Tajfel 1978; 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986; 
Hopkins 2011), we argue that young Somalis construct their social identity by comparing 
themselves with in- and out-group members. In this article, we analyse how young Somalis 
represent their social identity through comparisons with: Somali elders living in the same 
city; Somalis in Somalia and in the diaspora; and the majority society. In striving to construct 
a positive image of their social self vis-à-vis these groups, young Somalis engage in 
psychological strategies of separation from the out-group; of social creativity; or of social 
competition. These strategies are not used randomly, however. Drawing from the research 
that analyses how the socio-political context can influence the constitution of minorities’ 
                                                        
1 The research participants discussed ‘Somali’ identity as a marker of ethnic and cultural identity. None of the 
interviewees explicitly referred to national markers of identification (e.g. Somalilander or Puntlander) and they 
discussed clan identities as insignificant to them. In the article, we therefore understand ‘Somali identity’ as the 
expression of an ethnic identity (see also Fangen 2007).  
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collective identity (Koopmans et al. 2005; Odmalm 2005), we provide a contextualised 
assessment of the participants’ social identity representations and negotiations. We show that 
the degree to which the Swedish and British integration policies and discursive constructions 
of immigrants can influence which psychological strategies are adopted by young Somalis in 
developing their self-constructions.  
This article contributes to existing research on identity by providing a contextualised 
understanding of the psychological mechanisms that underpin minorities’ social identity 
constructions. This adds to the literature in social psychology on the topic, which tends to see 
social identity formation as the result of intra-group dynamics and often ignores the 
mediating role of the socio-political context in which groups are embedded. Vice-versa, the 
article also contributes to the research in political sociology on minorities’ identity that often 
does not account for the psychological strategies that are used by group members to react to 
negative representations of or threats to their social identity. As such, our article grounds 
socio-psychological processes of social identity formation in national and 
transnational/diasporic socio-political environments and social relations. Further, we 
contribute to existing research on minorities’ identity by comparing how young Somalis 
represent their social identity in Sweden and Britain. The comparative lens adopted here 
enables us to assess which expressions of social identity are influenced by states’ migrant 
integration discourses and policies, and which are the result of intra-group dynamics. 
In the following, we first present the analytical framework that informs our study. We review 
and integrate the relevant literature in social psychology and political sociology that pays 
attention to social identity formations. We suggest that the psychological mechanisms used 
by group members to represent their identity are influenced by real and symbolic constraints 
and opportunities created by the socio-political environment for migrant and minority groups. 
Second, we describe the main characteristics of the Swedish and British political 
environments. We then present the data and methods of analysis. In the following section, we 
compare the representations of young Somalis’ social identity in Sweden and Britain. We 
conclude the article by highlighting the importance of adopting a more nuanced 
understanding of social identity construction that looks at the interplay of social 
psychological factors, local and transnational group dynamics, and the political environment. 
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2. Social identity: contextualising psychological strategies  
A Social Identity approach is among the most prominent frameworks of analysis used in 
social psychology to study collective identities. A social identity involves a person’s 
‘knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance attached to the membership’ (Tajfel 1981, 255). The markers of social 
identities are defined from the in-group members’ comparisons with relevant out-groups 
along valued dimensions and people will differentiate between groups in ways that favour 
their ingroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986; Tajfel 1978; 1982). 
Low-status groups2, such as women in a sexist society or ethnic minorities in a racist world, 
are subject to devaluations by high-status groups, something that can affect their members’ 
positive self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Abrams et al. 2005). Low-status group 
members can adopt several psychological strategies to respond to such devaluations and they 
can act collectively to improve their situation. They can accept and internalise such 
hierarchies and choose not to engage with the society of settlement. In this instance, low-
status group members will separate themselves from society at large and focus on preserving 
their group’s characteristics (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In the context of multicultural 
societies, this often translates into minority groups limiting contact and participation with the 
majority society and embracing non-adaptive strategies to negotiate their social identity 
(Berry 1997). Alternatively, low-status groups may revaluate an ostensibly negative 
characteristic as positive or identify an alternative dimension on which the group is superior 
(‘social creativity’). The ‘Black is beautiful’ movement is an example of social creativity as it 
called for the positive redefinition of black social identity while the salient axis of 
differentiation -skin colour - remains the same (Tajfel 1978). Another example of social 
creativity is the low-status group’s engagement in imagining the high-status group’s social 
identity so that it includes some of the low-status group’s features. In multicultural societies, 
this is expressed in the creativity of ethnic/racial minorities to envisage a national identity 
that recognises both their group’s specificities and their identification with the country of 
settlement (Hopkins 2011). This dual identity, as any other social identity, must be socially 
validated by the majority society. As such, the degree to which the development of a dual 
identity is a feasible psychological strategy to respond to devaluations, is mediated by the 
                                                        
2 ‘Status’ refers to the group’s relative position on some evaluative comparators, and not socio-economic status 
(Tajfel & Turner 1986). 
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socio-political environment in which low-status groups operate, as we will discuss below. A 
third strategy low-status groups can engage with to respond to status hierarchies is to adopt 
socially competitive strategies such as antagonism and open hostility towards the high-status 
group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). 
Social identity representations are strongly influenced by both intra- and inter-group 
dynamics and comparisons (Verkuyten 1997; 2005; Deaux 2006; Jenkins 2008). In the case 
of multicultural societies, the society of settlement is an important out-group for the 
representation of ethnic minority group members’ social identity (Koopmans et al. 2005; 
Hopkins 2011; Ozyurt 2013). It delineates what distinguishes someone as e.g. ‘British’ or 
‘Swedish’ and as such determines the criteria for inclusion in or exclusion from its 
community. In this respect, it is important to understand not only the characteristics of the 
majority group’s social identity, but also the discursive and institutional structures that create 
opportunities and constraints for minority groups. We will return to this point.  
Group members can also derive a sense of social identity from comparisons with other 
ingroup members. For instance, family members and community elders are important referent 
groups as they instill in young people the values, customs, and ideals of their ethnic, national 
or religious background, thereby creating symbolic boundaries that define the group 
(Verkuyten 2005; Schoenpflug 2008; Gouldbourne et al. 2010; Schneider et al. 2012). People 
can also construct their social identity in relation to members of the ingroup who are 
geographically distant. In the context of migrant minorities, the multi-stranded relations 
between sending and receiving countries and with the diaspora have complex implications for 
the definition of young people’s social identity. These relations have often been overlooked 
in social psychology (see however Bathia 2008; Verkuyten 2005), but sociological research 
suggests that the country of origin (one’s own or the parents’) can provide a sense of mooring 
and rootedness (Bash et al. 1994; Levitt 2001; Waldinger 2015; Reynolds 2011). Similarly, 
belonging to a diasporic community can promote a feeling of kinship with other people 
scattered around the globe (Dufoix 2008). Young migrants in Europe, in constructing their 
social identity, compare themselves with transnational and diasporic communities. In these 
comparisons, young migrants develop psychological strategies that enable them to construct a 
cohesive narrative about belonging to their ethnic group vis-à-vis the understandings of social 
identity developed by people at ‘home’ or in the diaspora. 
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One of the key assumptions of this article is that social identities are not just the result of 
group comparisons. The socio-political context in which a group operates influences that 
group’s social identity. In particular, the settlement state’s integration policies, notions of 
national identity, and classification of immigrants influence migrants’ social identities in at 
least two ways. First, it offers status categories of identification that indicate specific 
constructions of the relations between immigrants and the settlement society (Koopmans et 
al. 2005; Odmalm 2005; Deaux 2006; Statham & Tillie 2016; van Heelsum & Koomen 
2016). The status categories offered in our case studies vary significantly. In Britain, the 
‘minority’ category predominates while in Sweden the dominant vocabulary favours the 
category of invandrare (Eng.: immigrant). Second, the receiving state can adopt integration 
policies that either favour conformity to a single cultural model shared by all citizens, or that 
support culturally pluralist conceptions3. The logics of these two models mediate migrants’ 
claims to national identification (Koopmans et al. 2005; Ozyurt 2013). Insistence to conform 
to a single cultural model could limit migrants’ opportunities to develop dual identifications 
with the majority and the minority groups, while policies and discourses that seek to retain 
and promote cultural heterogeneity may have the opposite effect (Odmalm 2005; Ozyurt 
2013; Dovidio et al. 2015). Sweden and Britain have historically adopted inclusive rights for 
migrants and minorities and they have done so through 'multicultural' policies (Koopmans et 
al. 2012). Their approach to multiculturalism varies, however. Britain has tended to recognise 
and represent racial and ethnic minority identities in the public sphere (Modood 2009). 
Sweden has instead provided migrants with generous access to rights while fossilising 
cleardifferences between the recipient society and immigrant communities (Odmalm 2005). 
In the following section, we present in greater detail the socio-political contexts in which the 
studies’ participants live and operate, emphasising how those can influence which 
psychological strategies are adopted by young Somalis as they negotiate their social identity.  
3. National contexts 
In this section, we focus on Britain’s and Sweden’s migrant integration paradigms and the 
categorisation of migrants used in policy and public discourses. We also present the general 
socioeconomic status of their Somali populations in both case studies. The section aims 
                                                        
3 Other institutional and legal elements, such as citizenship policies, may affect identification and behaviour, 
(Koopmans et al. 2005). Here we focus on the institutional structures that young Somalis directly engage with or 
are affected by. We do not include citizenship legislation as the participants had either naturalised at a young 
age with their parents, or they acquired Swedish or British citizenship at birth. They had not proactively 
naturalised, which is an indicator of socio-cultural integration in some countries (Ersanilli & Koopmans 2010). 
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primarily to provide contextual background for the article’s findings and analysis presented 
later.  
The Swedish approach to migrant integration, often described as pluralist and ‘multicultural’ 
(Koopmans et al. 2012), is built upon the integrative logics of a Scandinavian model of 
welfare state, advocating standardised institutional arrangements and rules that apply equally 
to all citizens (Borevi 2014). The main objective has historically been to minimise 
inequalities between native and migrant populations by means of centralised corporatist 
policies. Migrants in Sweden enjoy similar socio-economic and political rights to natives, and 
they have been enabled to preserve their culture and language. These rights were intended to 
provide migrants with the resources to maintain their cultures, rather than providing 
exemptions from the law on cultural or religious ground. Migrant organisations have been 
financially supported by the state, but have played a marginal role in the Swedish civic and 
political life as they had to meet criteria whereby they could not have political or religious 
interests. This has de facto turned them into cultural associations and has constrained their 
ability to act as service organisation aiding their conationals (Schierup & Karlsson 1991; 
Carlson et al. 2012). Participation in the labour market has always been a pivotal marker of 
migrants’ integration in society (Borevi 2014; Scuzzarello 2015). Integration policies, 
coupled with the strong state’s involvement in organising migrant lives and associational 
activities, have contributed to the establishment of symbolic boundary markers between the 
native majority, representing normality, and invandrarna whose ways of being are at best 
exoticised and at worse defined as a problem. This is reflected in the institutionalisation of 
cultural differences between the two, and the representation of the ‘Swedish way of life’ as 
the most common and desirable vis-à-vis a ‘non-Swedish’ way which becomes a deviation 
from the norm (Odmalm 2005; Dahlsted & Hertzberg 2007).  
Britain has adopted a more individualistic and market-oriented approach to migrants’ 
integration compared to the Swedish corporatist patterns. This approach, based on a ‘race 
relations’ model which was first introduced in the 1960s, relies on strong anti-discrimination 
legislation, especially in the labour market, which provides equal opportunities to combat 
discrimination that prevents individual equality of opportunity. The British race relations 
legislations do not provide minority rights as such, but rather allow - via the extension of 
anti‐discrimination claims to different groups through individual test cases - recognition to 
groups able to identify themselves as a publicly identified ‘racial’ group (Koopmans et al. 
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2005). The British multicultural framework that has evolved from race relations, recognises 
ethno-racial groups as public identities and allows groups to retain much of their cultural 
difference from the majority society. Recognition does not extend to religious groups, 
however. The lack of recognition for Muslims as a discriminated group within race relations, 
has contributed to the proactive political mobilisation of British Muslims (Statham et al. 
2005). Living in a country with which they identify as much as other ethnic minorities 
(O’Toole & Gale 2013), Muslims feel aggrieved and respond assertively by making demands 
on a state which they perceive relegates them to a ‘second class’ status in the national 
community. Muslims’ perceived grievances have worsened as Britain moved towards a 
policy paradigm that emphasises community cohesion and as the state intensified the 
surveillance of Muslim communities due to anti-radicalisation policies (Grillo 2007). 
Both countries host a sizeable Somali community, summarised in Table 1 in relation to the 
total population. As of 2016, there were 95.960 people in Sweden who were either born in 
Somalia or whose parents were born in Somalia, up from 57.752 in 2011 (SCB). The Somali 
population in Sweden has grown significantly since 2012 following a decision by the 
Migration Court which eases the requirements for family reunification (MIG 2012:1). This 
means that today Sweden hosts one of the largest Somali communities in Europe, together 
with Britain. The 2011 census estimates that 99.484 people of Somali descent live in Britain 
(ONS 2012). It is difficult to provide exact figures for how many British Somalis live in the 
UK, as ‘British Somali’ is not an ethnic category used in the 2011 census. Thus, it is likely 
that the real numbers are higher. Somalis arrived in Sweden and the UK at different times. 
The Somali community in Sweden first arrived as asylum seekers in the 1990s following the 
collapse of Siad Barre’s regime. The migration patterns of Somalis to Britain is more diverse 
as they first arrived as merchant seamen in the 19th century. In the 1960s, most came as 
economic migrants or dependants and from the 1980s, they primarily came to the UK as 
refugees (Open Society 2014). In addition, there are more recent arrivals of Somalis to the 
UK from other European countries (Carlson et al. 2012; van Liempt 2011).  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Somalis’ socioeconomic conditions in Sweden and Britain are similar. In both countries 
Somali communities tend to be clustered in city neighbourhoods with higher than average 
levels of deprivation, crime, unemployment and minimal services and amenities. This also 
applies to the participants in our research. The employment rates among Somalis in both 
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countries are lower than the national average, indicating issues with labour market integration 
leading to long term unemployment (Carlson et al. 2012; Kahn 2008). Levels of education 
within the community are also relatively low, and Somali children in both countries have 
been consistently at the bottom of achievement tables compared to other minority groups, 
suggesting potential problems of integration in the education system (Sporton & Valentine 
2007; REFERENCE REMOVED). Policy makers we interviewed in both municipalities 
consider the Somali community problematic:  
Somalis, because of a whole range of factors [...] have difficulties to integrate in the society, 
get a job and be independent (Study 1, Malmö, POL14). 
I think there are some [communities] that slip under the radar. At the moment the Somali 
community has sort of drifted in the last 5 – 10 years and the population is steadily growing 
(Study 1, Ealing, POL1) 
Policy actors mention high unemployment rates, risks for engaging in criminal activities, 
radicalisation, urban self-segregation, and tribalism as perceived reasons for Somalis’ lack of 
integration. 
4. Data and method 
This study draws from interviews and focus groups with 43 young Somalis living in Malmö 
and Ealing. The data was collected in two research projects studying migrants’ social 
identification and integration in Britain and Sweden5. The studies asked similar questions 
regarding social identification and they collected data with the same cohort (people of Somali 
descent aged 18-29), at the same time (2012-2013). The participants include both young 
adults who were born in Somalia or in refugee camps in neighbouring countries and who 
arrived in Europe before they reach teen-age (‘1.5 generation’) and those who were born in 
Europe (‘2nd generation’). The two groups grew up exposed to the influences of their families 
and immigrant communities and they have been socialised into the majority society’s culture 
through the education system and relations with peers and other minority groups. Also, the 
1.5 and 2nd generations in Malmö and Ealing have been influenced by poor socioeconomic 
characteristics of the immediate neighbourhoods in which they live. Because of these shared 
experiences, for analytic purposes we consider the respondents as belonging to one group of 
                                                        
4 Extracts are labelled by study, city and participant’s pseudonym.  
5 [REF STUDY 1; REF STUDY 2] 
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‘young Somalis’.6 We appreciate that Somalia’s political divisions may have fostered new 
political identities in Somalia and may also affect the identification of some Somali 
emigrants. However, as ‘Somali’ is the marker around which most Somalis, especially 
younger ones, mobilise in the societies of settlement, we decided to take it as unit of analysis 
rather than national-political identities. 
The data consists of 17 semi-structured interviews with young Somalis conducted in Ealing 
and in Malmö; and six focus groups conducted in Malmö with 26 young Somalis. 
Participants in both studies were recruited in language schools, ethnic/national associations 
and through snowballing. Table 2 summarises the sample’s demographic characteristics.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The article’s first author or trained, language competent research assistants carried out the 
one-hour long interviews. They were set up with identical thematic questions in Sweden and 
the UK, and looked at: self-identification (open question); identification with Sweden/ UK; 
identification with Somalia; and relationships with other Somalis in Sweden/ UK and in the 
diaspora. The second author mediated the six focus groups, divided by gender, with the aid of 
a translator. The semi-structured sessions lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. The moderator 
asked the participants about self-identification; relationship with the majority society; 
relationship and allegiance to the Somali diaspora; the importance of Somalia for their 
identification; and perceived discrimination. With permission of the participants, we recoded 
the interviews and focus groups. We guaranteed anonymity to all participants. Although 
modest in size, the sample enable us to gain a certain understanding of young Somalis’ social 
identity constructions. The sample is obviously not representative.  
We are aware that our professional role, gender, and ethnic background had an impact on the 
participants’ responses. For instance, most of them were reluctant to discuss issues of 
discrimination and racism. When mentioned, we invited the participants to discuss these 
issues further which has allowed us to reach some understanding of their perceived 
discrimination. Our outsider role to the group studied could pose some limitations to the 
research. We have address this by employing, when possible, Somali interviewers. This 
might have helped the participants to feel more at ease during the interview situation. 
                                                        
6  There are differences between the 1.5 and 2nd generations. Among others, the overall length of exposure to the 
influences of the majority society and the experience of displacement and migration. The effects of these factors 
will vary depending on the age at time of arrival. 
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We have analysed the data using a narrative interpretative approach of how people see 
themselves as group members (Hammack 2011). The participants’ narratives offer an insight 
into how they make sense of themselves and of their positions in the social world. Narratives 
also suggest the participants’ views of what is canonical and of what defines, in their 
perspective, a ‘true’ Somali. We analyse the data by identifying recurring referent groups the 
participants compare themselves to when presenting their social identity. We identify three 
main referent groups: Somali elders living in Ealing/Malmö; the Somali diasporic and 
transnational community; and the majority society (Brits/Swedes). The participants recognise 
Islam as a cornerstone of their self-identification (Berns McGowan 1999; Valentine et al. 
2009; Abdi 2015; Liberatore 2016). Given our focus on the referent groups that young 
Somalis compare themselves to when defining their social identity, we refer to Islam only to 
the degree to which it is mentioned by the participants as a theme within narratives of 
intergenerational relations; of relationships with the societies of settlement; and of belonging 
to the homeland and to the diaspora. As such, we discuss the significance of a British Muslim 
identity but analyse it not in relation to a broader ‘Islam-ness’, but in relation to Britain and 
Britishness. To account for the potential influence of the socio-political environment, we 
singled out references to integration policies; categorisation of immigrants; and public 
discourses and attitudes about immigrants. The study adopts a cross-national comparative 
research design. We compare the participants’ narratives of social identity and how they 
negotiate their Somalis identification in relation to Somali elders; Somalis in the diaspora and 
in Somalia; and the Swedish/British majority society. This comparative approach enables us 
to gauge the degree to which the psychological strategies used to try to change social 
hierarchies are influenced by the environment in which young Somalis live.  
5. Findings  
Our studies’ participants represented their social identity by drawing comparisons to 
predominantly three referent groups: Somali elders living in the same city and with whom the 
participants engage daily; their transnational extended families both in Somalia and in the 
diaspora and with whom the participants have sporadic contact; and the majority society. 
Below, we compare how the participants construct their social identity in relation to these 
referent groups in Malmö and Ealing. 
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Inter-generational differences 
The participants in both cities consistently refer to the differences between older and younger 
Somalis. In comparing themselves to the older generation, young Somalis acknowledge that 
the latter is a high-status group, with power to control and regulate. 
In the Somali culture, if someone sees you going to a club, if an older man or woman and 
sometimes even the younger ones see you, they’ll call your house and say “I saw X going 
to a club. It’s not good, it’s not good” [. . .] if people know you for these things, people 
won’t respect you, you’ll lose a lot of reputation (Study 1, Anwar, Ealing) 
Anwar suggests that to challenge the elders’ discursive construction of the group’s collective 
identity is risky and could have implications for one’s reputation. Those who do not conform 
to the predominant understanding of ‘proper’ Somali behaviour can be controlled and 
excluded by other, often older, Somalis. Some young Somalis in Ealing deal with this by 
alienating themselves from the local Somali community. Amun, for example, who works in 
Ealing, admits she is happy that her family lives South London. 
I know I’m working [in Ealing] but I don’t . . . I wouldn’t want to live here because . . . 
I don’t know…I want to get out of it, get out from here. It’s nice to see other [Somali] 
people around me [. . .] but…here it’s too much for me, too many people who know 
your business … it’s too close. (Study 1, Amun, Ealing) 
Other participants characterise their social identity in ways that distinguish them from the 
older generation. In Ealing, some suggest that the elders are psychologically living in the 
country of origin: 
The older generation has failed to get a grip of society. My mum is a perfect example. She’s 
been here for 20 years, and still can’t speak fluent English. (Study 1, Amaal, Ealing) 
Others argue that older Somalis in Ealing are attached to customs and norms that originate 
from their life in Somalia, as for instance tribalism: 
This [Somali] community cannot integrate, we cannot move forward unless there is 
integration and cohesion within ourselves. […] we are getting there [away from tribalism], 
and this is coming from the younger generation. The older generation… their brain is… 
stuck in their own way. (Study 1, Anwar, Ealing) 
In contrast, young Somalis in Ealing describe themselves as well integrated in British society 
and they often identify as British as well as Somalis. We will analyse this component of their 
social identity in greater detail later.  
While young Somalis in Ealing identify as British, which is an important inter-generational 
demarcation and differentiates them from allegedly poorly integrated elders, by contrast, 
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young Somalis in Malmö emphasise two main generational differences: one relates to gender 
relations and one to faith. One male participant says that: 
[Young Somali] men and women can sit together and discuss things, chat… (Study 2, Ali, 
Malmö) 
Ali suggests that young Somalis in Sweden have a different outlook on gender relations and 
that friendships between young men and women are common. These type of friendships, in 
Ali’s opinion, are not common among his parents. The second difference that the Swedish 
participants speak about concerns religion, as Mariam explains: 
There is a younger generation in Sweden who has become much more practising Muslims, 
who have taken faith to a different level which was not… which is not like in Somalia, I 
don’t think.  […] and it’s exciting to see this younger generation who behaves completely 
differently, who searches knowledge [about Islam] in a different way than the older 
generation did. (Study 2, Mariam, Malmö)  
Mariam suggests that faith is more important to young Somalis than it is to older Somalis. 
Islam proves to be a stable identity in the face of a constantly changing world and young 
Somalis can easily identify with it and actively search information about it.  
Young people of migrant background, in constructing their social identity, relate to and 
negotiate with the dominant narratives developed and maintained by elders which outline 
their community’s norms and obligations. The psychological strategy the participants engage 
with to achieve a positive distinctiveness from Somali elders is one of social creativity. In 
both Sweden and Britain they present new characteristics of what it means to be ‘Somali’ that 
distinguish them from Somali elders. In Ealing, the participants juxtapose themselves to 
allegedly traditional and non-integrated older Somalis. Young Somalis in contrast express 
belonging to British society. In Malmö, young Somalis re-examine and strengthen their 
Muslim identity rather than their clan-based one that is significant for the first generation (see 
Björk 2007), in addition to embracing more ‘Western’ behaviours such as having mixed-
gender friendships. The inter-generational differences illustrated above could be partly due to 
generational cleavages and that young people do not agree with their parents’ view of the 
world. In the context of migration, this may also have to do with young people introducing 
new ways of doing things that contrast with the older generation’s understandings of the 
group’s values and appropriate behaviour. This is not to say that young migrants’ 
representations of their social identity are always more progressive than their parents’. 
Rather, our point is that young Somalis engage in reframing stories about their collective self 
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that end up differing from their parents’. It is also important to underline that the deployment 
of oppositional comparisons with the first generation does not mean that the daily interactions 
between young and older Somalis are only characterised by divisions. Indeed, several 
participants emphasised how, when the needs arise, Somalis are supportive of each other as 
‘Somalis’:  
Question: Do you think Somalis in Malmö are united? 
Answer: Somalis are Somalis, we are from the same country. Regardless of which tribe we belong to, 
we speak the same language (Study 1, Fathia, Malmö) 
 
I think being really close knitted [is the main strength of the Somali community]. I think it’s 
quite negative sometimes whereby being so closely knitted everyone knows everyone else’s 
business but at the same times that also by knowing everyone’s business you can look out 
for people easier and no one is ever completely isolated. I think that’s the [emphasis] key 
strength. (Study 1, Mary, Ealing) 
Transnational connections: ‘home’ and the diaspora  
People who are part of a diasporic group, like Somalis, form and negotiate their social 
identity in relation to their, or their parents’, homeland. Respondents in both cities 
consistently refer to Somalia as ‘home’ regardless of whether they have ever been there, or 
whether they have been back since they were children. Most describe Somalia as a wonderful 
country before it was torn up by the war. For instance, Anwar recollects his first visit to 
Mogadishu in 11 years in the following way: 
My family and my mum would show me pictures and videos of when they were there [in 
Somalia] and where they would go. The capital city used to be the most beautiful city I’ve 
seen, even more beautiful than London […] it was beautiful but I was also aware of the 
civil war going on […] I was expecting [Mogadishu] to be in a worse state but not 
everything was destroyed […] I’ve never experienced the fresh air I have experienced in 
Somalia, the best fresh air, it was so good. At the same time, the food there…in my 
experience I couldn’t find it in any other country. The best food fresh, whatever you want, 
meat… everything is fresh, whatever you want they’ll make it in front of you. (Study 1, 
Anwar, Ealing) 
To young Somalis, Somalia is a spiritual and cultural home that provides them with deep-
rooted identification and emotional attachment. It informs a story in their construction of self-
identity about knowing where they come from. They grew up hearing stories of ‘home’, a 
distant place from where they are living now, fuelling a mythology of return:  
It’s important to keep a Somali identity, to work on it. It’s because we [Somalis] are 
dreaming of going back. Parents pass on the language, food, symbols, traditions… in the 
hope of coming back. Or at least so that their children will one day go back and rebuild 
Somalia. (Study 1, Omar, Ealing) 
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Omar, who was 24 years old at the time of the interview, has not been back to Somalia since 
he was nine. Yet, several times during the interview he expresses a strong desire to return to 
Somalia, saying that if he managed to pursue his dream he would “kiss the ground as soon as 
I get off the plane”.  
The ways in which young Somalis relate to their ‘homeland’ and its people bring into sharp 
relief the complexities intrinsic to social identity negotiations. Even though the idea of 
Somalia as an idealised, emotional ‘home’ plays an important role in the narration of young 
Somalis’ sense of self, it is rarely seen as part of their future. When asked if they would 
movie to Somalia, most participants were hesitant.  
In 15 years… I’d probably like to have a house in Somalia. But I’d still need my house in 
London. One foot in, one foot out. A holiday destination but come back to reality (Study 
1, Khalid, Ealing) 
The main reason why they would not move to Somalia is not the lack of security, but cultural 
differences. Although they refer to Somalia as their ‘homeland’, most participants are aware 
that they do not fit there. Basr’s experience illustrates this. A 24 years-old woman who left 
Somalia when she was two, Basr retains an interest in Somalia and is one of the few 
interviewees who wants to move back even though she feels she does not fully fit in:  
Their [Somalis’] expectations sometimes made me feel stupid. When you can’t eat with 
your hands properly, when you can’t use the toilets that you have to squat down on, when 
you understand 100% what they’re saying but you get stuck with the words to express 
yourself properly. (Study 1, Basr, Ealing) 
Basr realises that in the eyes of people in Somalia she is regarded as ‘westerner’, and that this 
is seen negatively, as Ubah confirms.  
They [in Somalia] feel that we’re more Westerner, they use it in a derogatory manner, that 
we’ve lost our culture and that we do things that are not allowed in our culture and religion 
(Study 1, Ubah, Ealing) 
The participants’ Somali identity is questioned by family and friends in Somalia. 
Furthermore, the encounter with their Somali family in the homeland made some participants 
acutely aware of their European identity. 
[When I visited Somalia] is when it really hit me, I saw myself as British Somali.  (Study 
1, Khalia, Ealing) 
I feel more Swedish in Somalia than I have ever done in Sweden. I was living in Somalia 
for one year and then I really, really felt like a Swede. And people called me ‘the Swedish 
girl’ and that’s how I felt. (Study 2, Amina, Malmö) 
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While the participants look Somali, and are therefore ‘insiders’ to Somali society, their 
accent, gestures, dress-code position them as ‘outsiders’ to the local community and their 
British or Swedish identity surfaces to become central to their self-definition7.  
The diaspora is another important point of reference for young Somalis. The participants 
frequently construct their social identity in opposition to their peers living in other countries. 
By doing this, they engage in a strategy of social competition that favours their in-group as 
Somalis in Sweden or Britain respectively. In the UK, young Somalis suggest that Somalis 
living elsewhere in the West are culturally closer to their society of settlement, more blasé 
about Somali customs and ways of living.   
They do behave differently in the way that they seem more integrated into their Dutch 
culture […] I’d say I’m well integrated in the mainstream [UK] society but I still keep my 
cultural identity […] whereas them, they’ve integrated […] and if you’d say ‘who are you’, 
they’d say ‘Dutch’ first. (Study 1, Khalid, Ealing)  
Khalid claims that young Somalis in the Netherlands are not as close to their Somali identity 
as British Somalis are. To him they identify primarily as ‘Dutch’. Basr recalls meeting her 
cousin who lives in Canada: 
My cousin came to my house and she walks into the house in a miniskirt and we are looking 
at her like ‘are you serious?’ shocked and scandalised. And the funny thing is that we were 
raised here [in the UK], we know that people do this, we know it’s normal, we have friends 
who do it, and up until a certain age we did it, but I feel [that] to a certain point you’re not 
Somali if you’re doing that. (Study 1, Basr, Ealing) 
To Basr, her cousin’s dress code is not a reaction against traditional Somali norms but rather 
the indication that she had fully adopted a Canadian life-style and that she is oblivious of 
what being Somali is about. In comparison, young British Somalis say that their parents have 
been very strict about teaching them about Somali culture and identity, in the hope they may 
one day return.  
Young Somalis in Sweden also positively distinguish themselves from Somalis in the 
diaspora, particularly those living in the UK.  
In the UK they’re more religious. Many Somalis there wear jilbabs and so. And at the same 
time there are many who are not religious at all. There are many over there who are 
religious and have double standards. One day they behave religiously and the other they 
                                                        
7 It should be noted that, despite the cognitive dissimilation observed in this article, Somalis are strongly 
involved in transnational activism aiming to alleviate poverty in Somalia (Hammond 2013). 
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don’t. When it comes to language, I think it’s them [Somalis in the UK] who don’t know 
the language. We have language tuitions in Scandinavia. Somalis who live here can speak 
their language very well (Study 1, Maka, Malmö) 
To Maka, Somalis in Britain are more religious, partly because of what is perceived to be a 
stronger acceptance of Islam in Britain. She questions their religiosity, however, and suggests 
their behaviour is hypocritical. Maka also indicates that the institutional structure of 
opportunity in Sweden, which provides children of migrant background with free language 
tuitions at school, enables Somalis to speak their language better. Somalis elsewhere do not 
benefit from this and are therefore less fluent in Somali.  
There is a significant difference between how young Somalis in Sweden and the UK 
represent their social identity in relation to people in Somalia and to the diaspora. In relation 
to their kin in Somalia, the participants in both countries seem to accept their low-status 
group position. They respect the Somali society’s understanding of ‘Somali’ ethnic identity, 
but they do not seem fully able to engage with it and are aware of their ambiguous position as 
insiders and outsiders to Somali society. This seems to create a cognitive distance between 
the participants and the people in the Somalia, expressed in young European Somalis 
increased awareness of the Swedish and British components of their social identity. As a 
result, to some participants Somalia becomes a place where to spend vacations, for then going 
back to their ‘reality’ in Europe. The participants’ relation to the diaspora is different. Young 
Somalis in both cities adopt a high-status position vis-à-vis their peers in the diaspora. Their 
social identity construction developed in comparison with the diaspora is underpinned by a 
psychological strategy of social competition which is expressed in the desire to claim 
cultural, moral, and linguistic authenticity. They legitimise their position relative to the 
diaspora with reference to the socio-political contexts in which they live and which enables 
them to be more ‘truly’ Somali by being more fluent in Somali (in Sweden) or knowing 
Somali culture better (in Britain). 
Young Somalis and the majority society 
Our data suggests that the British socio-political context has facilitated the development of 
young Somalis’ collective identification that includes a sense of being British, as illustrated 
below.  
I have two identities, I’m Somali first, by blood and then I’m British after that. I know both 
cultures very,very,very well and I’ve adapted very well to this country […] I can now 
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switch between being Somali when I’m at home or to be British when I’m out and about. 
(Study 1, Omar, Ealing) 
I’d probably say I’m Muslim first, then Somali, then British. […] Because I’m more of a 
hybrid of the two cultures Rather than just being one. At times [Somali and British] or a 
joint first, at times when I’m watching a football game you could say I’m more British, but 
then at other times you could say I’m more Somali then British. (Study 1, Amun, Ealing) 
Young Somalis can switch between cultural frames and languages depending on the situation: 
they can be Somali in the home’s private sphere and British in the public domain, as said by 
Omar. In the context of British multiculturalism, young Somalis have been able to define 
their own identities and thus find a space to identify with the mainstream.  
In Ealing, culture and religion define what you do, how you do it. I think it has a lot to do 
with British society allowing multiculturalism. (Study 1, Basr, Ealing) 
To identify as British is something that taps on young Somalis’ sense of civic identity.  
I’m Muslim first, second thing I’m Somali and third thing I’m British. Because Somali is 
my origin and my origin is more important than my citizenship. My faith and my belief is 
Islam, my origin is Somali and my citizenship is British. (Study 1, Anwar, Ealing) 
Anwar suggests that the category of ‘British’ provides him and other young Somalis with 
rights and obligations that make them feel part of the British national community 
(REFERENCE REMOVED). This sense of identification with Britain does not necessarily 
result from in-depth contacts with the majority society.  
The thing is I don’t gravitate towards English people, not in a bad way but my friends are 
from everywhere and most of them were born and raised here but aren’t necessarily white 
Caucasian English people. (Study 1, Amun. Ealing) 
Amun, as many other participants in Ealing, indicates that her social network is highly 
diverse, and that she has not established many close friendships with white British people. 
Identification with Britain seems to emerge despite experiences of institutional racism. Omar, 
for instance, recounted after the interview was completed that he had been repeatedly ill-
treated by the police. He had been stop-and-searched several times without justifications, spat 
on and bullied by officers on his way to work or to friends. In his opinion, his skin colour and 
the stereotypes attached to young black males in the UK explain the police’s behaviour. 
Despite the resistance they face from some segments of the British society, young Somalis 
have carved a sense of belonging to Britain which to many is “the only home I know, and the 
only home I can remember”, as expressed by Amun.  
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In Sweden, young Somalis’ negotiations of their self-identity in relation to the majority 
society emphasise the differences between Somalis and Swedes. 
When I am there [in Africa] people call me Swede because I haven’t lived there in a long 
time, but when I’m in Sweden I’m an immigrant. I don’t really know what my ethnicity is. 
I cannot feel Somali, like fully Somali, or Swedish […] the difficult thing is that being 
Swedish doesn’t really mean much to me, most Swedes see me as an immigrant and in the 
home country they see me as Swede. So I guess I am both. (Study 1, Abukar, Malmö) 
Because of the Swedish society’s attitudes, Abukar is not comfortable with calling himself 
Swedish or Somali-Swedish. He is positioned as an immigrant. This echoes other 
participants’ perceptions that multiple identifications as Somalis and Swedes are not 
validated by native Swedes. 
There is no word in Swedish for ‘Somali-Swedes’ like you have ‘African-American’ in the 
US. In Sweden people say ‘I’m Swedish’ but how do Swedes look like? Are they black or 
white? (Study 2, Samatar, Malmö)  
As soon as I came back to Sweden [from Somalia where she was identified as ‘the Swedish 
girl’] that label ‘Swedish’ was not clear to me anymore. The rest of society doesn’t use it 
to describe me, so I don’t use it either. (Study 2, Amina, Malmö) 
The lack of acceptance in the public discourse for a hyphenated identity such as ‘African-
American’, or ‘British Somali’, excludes young Somalis from being considered Swedish. 
Also, their blackness automatically positions them as outsiders to the mainstream, and, in 
their opinion, it makes it difficult for them to be perceived as fellow countrymen by native 
Swedes. This is exacerbated by perceived discrimination, reported by some respondents.  
Abukar: People think that Somalis don’t work. Swedes think that Somalis are lazy and live 
on benefits. The truth is that they [Somalis] try their best. […] I think that the municipality 
has failed, or rather that Sweden has failed with integration politics because it is always so 
that immigrants are exposed, unemployed, criminal and in the media.  
Interviewer: Do you feel integrated? 
Abukar: No, not at all.  (Study 1, Abukar. Malmö) 
 
Abukar, who was 20 years old at the time of the interview, is very vocal about how Somalis 
and migrants in general are subjected to discrimination, which makes him feel excluded from 
the Swedish society even though he has lived in Sweden since he was three years old. During 
the interview, he also said that he had never experienced discrimination first hand. This 
suggests that the collective experiences of discriminations among the Somali community in 
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Sweden resonate with the young participants, even if they may not have experienced it 
directly. 
Several participants in Sweden show a high degree of agency in how they negotiate their 
belonging to the national community. Their perceived lack of inclusion in society seems to 
lead young Somalis to be defiant about the category of ‘Swedish’ while in Sweden.  
They [Swedes] don’t call me ‘the Swedish girl’ or woman, it’s not the first thing they say. 
And then I won’t say it either! It’s a revolt! I mean, then I won’t use that word either. It’s 
automatic that I call myself Somali. (Study 2, Amina, Malmö) 
To Amina not to call herself Swedish is an act of resistance against perceived discrimination 
and exclusion. While feeling excluded from the Swedish society, in some circumstances they 
identify as Swedish or Somali- Swedish.  
Samtar: If a migrant asks, you can say ‘I’m Swedish’ but if a white person asks… [Laughs] 
if a real Swede asks then you don’t know what to say. 
Moderator: So it depends on the situation, isn’t it? What happens if you are in Copenhagen 
and meet a Somali? Would you say you are Swedish? 
Samtar: no, no I’m Somali then 
Moderator: and if you are, say, in Berlin and meet a Swede? 
Samtar: Well, then at least I can say I’m from Sweden, I do speak the language after all! 
You also say that you are Somali-Swedish when you meet others, like a Brit in Dubai. 
(Study 2, Samtar, Malmö) 
It’s a very conscious choice not to call myself Swedish in Sweden, more so than when I am 
abroad. Then, when I travel I do so with a Swedish passport, and I never had any other 
passports! It’s clearer to me, easier even, to say that I am Swedish [when I am abroad] than 
when I’m in Sweden (Study 2, Amina, Malmö)  
Typically, the participants enact their Swedish identity if their interlocutor is a fellow migrant 
or if they are abroad. The category of ‘Swede’ is therefore significant to young Somalis but it 
becomes salient in contexts where it is a resource to either underline their differences from 
other Somalis or similarities with other Europeans.  
The comparison between the ways young Somalis in Sweden and Britain construct their 
Somali social identity in relation to the majority society reveals striking differences. Young 
Somalis in Ealing are creatively envisioning a social identity that includes commonalities 
with Britain as well as a sense of minority group distinctiveness. Effectively, they are 
changing the values assigned by the majority society to Somalis as difficult to integrate and 
‘slipping under the radar’. The respondents in Ealing portray Somalis as fully able to be 
British as Somalis and Muslims and in this way, they challenge monolithic understandings of 
British identity that they encounter in their daily life. The British socio-political context 
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seems to have influenced their social identity as it has created a pluralist institutional 
environment where there is a perceived compatibility between minorities and the majority 
society. Swedish Somalis’ social identity also encompasses a sense of identification with the 
recipient society, but it is expressed primarily when they are abroad as this aspect of their 
identification is not validated by the Swedish society. Sweden’s socio-political context seems 
to affect young Somalis’ social identity as it discourages the formation of multiple 
identifications that could encompass multiple allegiances and belongings. Discrimination, 
negative stereotypes about the Somali community in Sweden, and the failure of the majority 
population to see them as part of society lead young Somalis in Sweden to conclude that their 
ethnic identity and the majority society’s Swedish identity are incompatible. Young Somalis 
in Sweden, unable to disrupt public discourses that place them as outsiders to society, appear 
therefore to construct their social identity in antagonism to Swedish society. They react to 
these positionings and devaluations by seeking positive distinctiveness from the majority 
society and proactively resist self-identifying as Swedes in Sweden.  
6. Conclusions  
In recent years, political debates have engaged in sharp discussions about migrants and 
minority groups as social problems challenging the national unity of the country of residence. 
In an era of ‘superdiversity’, migrants’ allegiances, and those of their children, is scrutinised 
as politicians and members of the public question the degree to which migrants identify with 
their country of origin or with the one they are living in. These arguments often neglect how 
these people identify themselves. In this article, we have focused on these self-constructions 
showing that there are differences in the ways young members of the same ethnic group 
construct their identity and that these differences depend on the socio-political environment 
they are embedded in.  
The data presented in this article shows that young people of migrant descent constantly 
negotiate their social identity in relation to the society of settlement and to members of the 
same ethnic group. Our approach, which combines insights from social psychology and 
political sociology on social identity formation processes among minorities, has enabled us to 
better understand the processes behind these negotiations. We have shown that young 
Somalis challenge hierarchies that position them vis-à-vis Somali elders; Somalis in Somalia 
and in the diaspora; and the recipient society. They do so by tapping in psychological 
strategies of social competition, social creativity and separation. We have been able to 
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advance our understanding of social identity constructions by contextualising these findings. 
First, we have shown that these multiple negotiations are important components of young 
Somalis’ social identity. Second, we have demonstrated that integration policies and 
discourses about immigrants influence the strategies young Somalis adopt to challenge social 
hierarchies between them and other referent groups. The different ways that multiculturalism 
has been adopted in Sweden and Britain brought into relief in the ways in which the research 
participants construct their social identity in relation to the majority society. In Sweden, 
migrants have been able to maintain their culture, through for instance mother tongue tuitions 
at school. At the same time, they have been put under pressure (and largely failed) to enter 
the labour market to ‘integrate’ and their way of life has been exoticised in public discourses, 
de facto establishing clear boundaries between native Swedes and invandrarna. To respond 
to this and seek a positive identity, young Somalis seem to have entered into competition with 
native Swedes. For instance, while they identify as ‘Swedish’ in some contexts, they refuse to 
do so in Sweden as this aspect of their social identity is not validated by the majority society. 
In contrast, the UK seems to provide young Somalis the cultural and political space to be 
creative in countering the majority society’s construction of British identity. They can be 
British, Somali, and Muslims at the same time, and they express that they can contribute to 
the British civic and social life, because of their diverse background, not in spite of it. This 
finding challenges the idea that there needs to be a tension between one’s religious, ethnic 
and national identity. Given a favourable socio-political context, as the British one seems to 
be, migrants and minorities can develop different, and equally valuable, ways of being part of 
the society of residence.  
In a way, we expected that the socio-political environment would influence minorities’ social 
identity. After all, integration policies define the relation between the native majority society 
and that society’s ethnic and religious minorities (see also Koopmans et al. 2005; Statham 
and Tillie 2016). The interviews we have analysed indicate that the socio-political 
environment is also important in shaping the psychological strategies young Somalis use vis-
à-vis Somalis in Somalia and in the diaspora. The participants in both countries use the same 
psychological strategies to deal with the hierarchies that position them in relation to their 
peers back ‘home’ (separation) and to other Somalis in the diaspora (social competition). 
They reinforce the differences between themselves from these groups by referring to life and 
politics in Britain and Sweden. For instance, they refer to the different customs between 
Somalia and Britain/Sweden and acknowledge that they do not fully fit in their ‘home’ 
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country. Also, they refer to British multiculturalism or to Swedish integration policies to 
emphasise their authentic Somali identity compared to their peers in the diaspora. Future 
research into minorities’ social identities ought to acknowledge the interplay between 
psychological strategies and socio-political environment and attempt to understand how and 
why the context in which a group lives influences its members social psychology and 
identification.  
This study has broader implications too. If we are to gauge young migrants’ aspirations and 
expectations to be part of the society where they live, the analysis of their social identity and 
which factors influence it, is a valid start. To understand how young migrants construct their 
social identity could allow us to better appreciate the degree to which young migrants feel 
supported or constrained by older generations, and how they deal with this. Further, a study 
of social identity could lead to a better understanding of how (and if) young migrants strike a 
balance between identifying with their place of origin and the place of residence. Whether 
these constructions would be accepted by the majority society cannot be assumed, and the 
current anti-immigrant political climate in Britain and Sweden does not bode for optimism. 
The findings of this paper suggest that the lack of recognition of one’s identification with the 
majority society does not necessarily lead to an increased identification with the country of 
origin, as in the Swedish case. Nor does the identification with the majority society 
necessarily lead to their social and political separation from the people in their country of 
origins, as we have seen among British Somalis. Instead, it seems that these referent groups 
are always present in the cognitive horizon of young Somalis who try to uphold their social 
identity in relation to all of them. This finding has political implications. Critics of 
multiculturalism sometimes point to minority group’s antagonism to and separation from the 
majority society and put the burden of responsibility on minorities’ own lack of integration 
and excessive attachment to the country of origin. This article shows that minority group 
members’ own conceptualisation of their social identity is much more complex than these 
critical voices recognise.  
7. References 
Abdi, C. 2015. Elusive Jannah. The Somali diaspora and a borderless Muslim identity. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Abrams, D., Hogg, M. A., & Marques, J. M. (2005). A social psychological framework for 
understanding social inclusion and exclusion. In D. Abrams, M. A. Hogg, & J. M. Marques 
24 
 
(Eds.), The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion (pp. 1–23). New York: Psychology 
Press 
Alba, R. and Foner, N. 2015. Strangers no more: immigration and the challenges of 
integration in North America and Western Europe. Princeton University Press. 
Basch, L., Glick Schiller, N; Szanton Blanc, C. 1994. Nations unbound: transnational 
projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states. New York: 
Routledge. 
Berns McGowan, R. 1999. Muslims in the Diaspora. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 
Berry, J. 1997. Immigration, acculturation, and adaption. Applied Psychology: an 
International Review 46(1): 5-68.  
Bhatia, S. 2008. Rethinking culture and identity in psychology: towards a transnational 
cultural psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 28(1): 301-321 
Björk, S. 2007. Modernity Meets Clan: Cultural Intimacy in the Somali Diaspora. In Kusow 
A. and Björk S. (eds.) From Mogadishu to Dixon: The Somali Diaspora in a Global Context. 
Red Sea Press: Trenton, NJ 
Borevi, K. 2014. Multiculturalism and welfare state integration: Swedish model path 
dependency. Identities 21(6): 708-723. 
Carlson, B.; Magnusson, K. and Rönnqvist, R. 2012. Somalier på arbetsmarknaden – har 
Sverige något att lära? Stockholm: Fritzes. 
Dahlstedt, M and Hertzberg. F. 2007. Democracy the Swedish Way? The Exclusion of 
‘Immigrants’ in Swedish Politics. Scandinavian Political Studies, 30 (2):175-203. 
Deaux, K. 2006. To be an immigrant. New York: Russel Sage Foundation 
Dovidio, J. F., Saguy, T., Ufkes, E. G., Scheepers, D., & Gaertner, S. L. (2015). Inclusive 
identity and the psychology of social change. In J. P. Forgas, K. Fiedler, & W. D. Crano 
(Eds.), Social Psychology and Politics. New York NY: Psychology Press. Pp.  
Dufoix, S. 2008. Diasporas. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Ersanilli, E. and Koopmans, R. 2010. Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and 
the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany. 
Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(5): 773-791. 
Fangen, K. 2007. Breaking Up the Different Constituting Parts of Ethnicity. The Case of 
Young Somalis in Norway. Acta Sociologica Vol 50(4): 401–414. 
Goulbourne, H.; Reynolds, T.; Solomos, J.; and Zontini, E. 2010. Transnational Families. 
Ethnicities, Identities and Social Capital. London: Routledge.  
Grillo. R. 2007. An excess of alterity? Debating difference in a multicultural society. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 30(6): 979-998. 
25 
 
Hammack, P. 2011. Narrative and the politics of identity: The cultural psychology of Israeli 
and Palestinian youth. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hammond, L. 2013. ‘Somali transnational activism and integration in the UK: mutually 
supporting strategies’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 39(6):1001-1017. 
Hopkins, N. 2011. Dual identities and their recognition: minority group members’ 
perspectives. Political Psychology 32(2):251-270. 
Jenkins. R. 2008.  Social Identity. 3rd edition. London: Routledge. 
Kahn, K. 2008. Employment of Foreign Workers Male and Female Labour Market 
Participation. Office for National Statistics.  
Koopmans, R.; Michalowski, I. and Waibel, S. 2012. Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: 
National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–
2008. American Journal of Sociology 117(4): 1202-1245. 
Koopmans, R.; Statham, P. Giuni, M.; Passy, F. 2005. Contested citizenship. Immigration 
and cultural diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Levitt, P. 2001. The transnational villagers. University of California Press 
Liberatore, G. 2016. “For My Mum It Comes with the Culture”: Intergenerational Dynamics 
and Young Somali Women’s Interventions within Multicultural Debates in Britain. Bildhaan: 
An International Journal of Somali Studies. 16: 49-64. 
MIG 2012: 1. Migrationsöverdomstolen Målnummer: UM10897-10 
Modood, T. 2009. The state and ethno-religious mobilization in Britain. In Hochschild, J. and 
Mollenkopf, J. (eds.). Bringing outsiders in. transatlantic perspectives on immigrant political 
incorporation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pp 233-249. 
O’Toole, T. and Gale, R. 2013. Political engagement amongst ethnic minority young people. 
Making a difference. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Odmalm, P. 2005. Migration policies and Political Participation. Inclusion or intrusion in 
Western Europe? Houndmills: Palgrave. 
ONS 2012. 2011 Census, key statistics for local authorities in England and Wales. Table 
QS203EW. 
Open Society. 2014. Somalis in London. At home in Europe. New York: Open Society 
Foundations. 
Ozyurt, S. 2013. Negotiating multiple identities, constructing Western-Muslim selves in the 
Netherlands and the United States. Political Psychology 34(2):239-263. 
Reynolds, T. 2011 "Birds of a Feather Stick Together"? Negotiating Community, Family and 
Intimate Relationships between 'Established' and 'Newcomer' Caribbean Migrants in Britain, 
in Community Work and Family, 6 (4):537-553 
26 
 
SCB 2015. Antal personer efter utländsk/svensk bakgrund, ålder och år.  
http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/sq/9686  
Schierup, C. and Karlsson, L. 1991. Ett etniskt Babels torn: Invandrarorganisationerna och 
den uteblivna dialogen. Sociologisk forskning, 28 (3): 3–22. 
Schneider, J.; Fokkema, T.; Matias, R.; Stojčić, S.; Ugrina, D.; and Vera-Larrucea, C. 2012. 
Identities: Urban belonging and intercultural relations. In Crul, M; Schneider, J.; and Lelie, F. 
(eds.) The European Second Generation Compared. Does the Integration Context Matter? 
IMISCOE Research Series. Pp. 285-340. 
Schoenpflug, U. 2008. Cultural transmission: Psychological, developmental, social, and 
methodological aspects. Cambridge University Press 
Scuzzarello, S. 2015. Policy actors' narrative constructions of migrants' integration in Malmö 
and Bologna. Ethnic and Racial Studies 38(1): 57-74. 
Sporton, D. and Valentine, G. 2007. Identities on the Move: the integration experiences of 
Somali refugee and asylum seeker young people. 
https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.268533!/file/identities_on_the_move.pdf  
Statham, P. and Tillie, J. 2016. Muslims in their European societies of settlement: a 
comparative agenda for empirical research on socio-cultural integration across countries and 
groups. Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 42(2): 177-196. 
Statham, P.; Koopmans, R; Giuni; M; and Passy, F. 2005. Resilient or adaptable Islam? 
Multiculturalism, religion and migrants’ claims-making for group demands in Britain, the 
Netherlands and France. Ethnicities 5(4): 427-459.  
Tajfel H. and Turner J. 1979. An integrated theory of intergroup conflict. In Austin, W. and 
Worchel, S. (eds.). The social psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey: Brooks/Cole 
Pub. Co., pp 33-47. 
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. 1986. The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In S. 
Worchel & W.G. Austin (eds.). Psychology of intergroup relations (2nd ed.), pp 7-24. 
Tajfel, H. 1978. The social psychology of minorities. London: Minority Right Group 
International. 
Tajfel, H. 1981. Human groups and social categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tajfel, H. 1982. Social Psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology 33, 
1-39. 
Valentine, G; Sporton, D.; and Bang Nielson, K. 2009. ‘Identities and belonging: a study of 
Somali refugee and asylum seekers living in the UK and Denmark’. Environment and 
Planning D: society and space, 27: 234-250. 
Van Heelsum, A. and Koomen, M. 2016. Ascription and identity. Differences between 
firstand second-generation Moroccans in the way ascription influences religious, national and 
ethnic group identification. Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 42(2): 277-291.  
27 
 
van Liempt, I. 2011. ‘And then one day they all moved to Leicester’: the relocation of 
Somalis from the Netherlands to the UK explained’. Population, Space and Place, 17(3), 
254-266.   
Verkuyten, M. 1997. Discourses of ethnic minority identity. British Journal of Social 
Psychology 36(4): 565-586. 
Verkuyten, M. 2005. The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity. Hove & New York: 
Psychology Press. 
Vertovec, S. 2007. Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies 30(6): 
1024-1054 
Waldinger, R. 2015. The cross-border connections: Immigrants, Emigrants, and Their 
Homelands. Harvard University Press. 
Waters, M. and Kasinitz, P. 2012. Discrimination, race relations and the second generation. 
Social Research 77 (1): 101-132. 
  
28 
 
TABLES 
  
 Total population Foreign born (% of 
tot population) 
Residents of Somali 
origin (% of foreign 
born population) 
United Kingdom (2011) 56,075,912 7.961.000 (12.5%) 99.484 (1.2%) 
Sweden (2016) 9.995.153 1.784.497 (17.8%)  95.960 (2.3%) 
Table 1, Demographic characteristics of Sweden and the UK. (ONS 2012; SCB) 
 
 Malmö  Ealing 
 Male Female Male  Female 
Interviews 4 2 4 7 
Focus groups 17 9 - - 
 Tot N: 43 
Table 2, Sample’s demographics 
